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DISRUPTIONS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS:  





























ETFs have become one of the most prominent innovations of the last decades. Increasing 
interest among fixed-income ETFs generated concerns about their structural fragility, especially 
during periods of market stress. The covid-19 pandemic provides a unique laboratory to 
evaluate its resiliency. The analysis using daily data on fund performance and monthly 
observations on fund flow showed a significant drop in returns during the pandemic outbreak 
and outflows among ETFs with illiquid underlings, reporting differences across fund 
geographies.  The regression results revealed evidence of the two unprecedented Federal 
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) are among the most prominent and fastest-growing financial 
product innovations of the past two decades. ETFs are a cost-efficient and convenient tool to 
buy in a market index, a particular region, commodity, or any investment theme without owning 
all the constitutes. An ETF investor buys a unit of a fund that trades like equity on a secondary 
market, and like any other listed security, its shares are traded continuously at market prices. 
Also, ETFs allow investors to diversify their portfolios in a tax-efficient way. Besides, fixed-
income ETFs bring liquidity to the inherently illiquid bond market.  
Despite the clear benefits to investors, ETFs may pose additional market risks. One of the 
main risks comes from ETFs' heavy trading that adds co-movement and volatility in the 
underlying securities (Turner and Sushiko 2018). The associated risk may become especially 
problematic during times of market stress when ETF shares tend to be less liquid (Marco, 
Serrano, and Zechner 2019). This concern is fundamental for bond ETFs because they are 
composed of illiquid underlying securities that trade over the counter.  
ETFs were developed in the 1990s and have gained immense popularity among investors. 
In August 2020, the assets under management (AUM) of ETFs reached $7 trillion for the first 
time (Financial Times 2020). In October 2020, the AUM of bond ETFs solely surpassed $1.4 
trillion, making them one of the fastest-growing asset management categories (iShares 2020).  
Market disruption occurs when markets stop functioning regularly, often leading to large 
and rapid market declines. Disruptions occur due to prevalent investors' fear that a specific 
factor will cease businesses' normal functioning. Regulation and institutional changes, new 
technologies, or evolving demands are some of the main reasons that initiate crashes leading to 
market disruptions. The financial crisis of 2008 and the rapid growth of the AUM of investment 
funds led to assorted regulation development. However, those changes did not impose 
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substantial market stress, and practitioners could not assess ETFs’ resiliency, leading to an 
intensification of the speculations about their fragility.  
The recent events that emerged due to the covid-19 crisis give an unprecedented 
opportunity to assess the implication of the ETF’s growth during turbulent times. On January 
9, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) confirmed the first coronavirus-related case in 
Wuhan, China. In just a matter of two weeks, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) announced the first coronavirus case in the US, and soon, the virus became a global 
concern. In February 2020, travel restrictions were imposed, refraining tourism and breaking 
major supply chains.  Economies were on a halt disrupting the regular functioning of businesses. 
On March 13, WHO declared covid-19 as a pandemic, and two days later, Donald Trump 
announced a national emergency, unlocking billions of dollars in federal support to fight the 
disease. Financial markets were fast to react and took a big hit.  
Recent studies already show evidence of the financial market stress during this period. In 
particular, Kargar, Lester, Lindsay, Liu, Weill, and Zúñiga (2020) documented that liquidity 
conditions for corporate bonds substantially deteriorated at the height of the crisis, and the Fed's 
announcements of interventions coincided with improvements in trading conditions in the bond 
market. Also, Haddad, Moreira, and Muir (2020) shared similar findings. They showed that 
bond ETFs traded at large discounts, especially on the safer end of the spectrum and that Fed's 
announcement to buy investment-grade debt pushed up prices and lowered bonds spread. 
Multiples press reports from ETF providers revealed that bond ETFs were resilient and more 
reliable for price discovery than the underlying bonds despite the turbulent times. Also, 
regardless of the speculation that Authorized Participants might step away in periods of market 
stress, ETFs functioned properly amidst the spiking volumes and high volatility (e.g., Blackrock 
2020). 
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This study aims to provide systematic empirical analysis to assess the impact of the 
market stress caused by the covid-19 crisis and unprecedented Federal Reserve direct support 
and their implications for ETFs. The research complements the current literature by 
emphasizing ETFs and provides additional insights for different fund types. The main focus is 
on bond ETFs as they are an ideal laboratory to evaluate this task since their underlying indexes 
base on illiquid assets trading in OTC markets. Also, the additional data span covering the time 
period up to September 2020 allows for assessing the effects from a longer perspective than the 
existing studies. 
First, I document the magnitude and timing of the crisis on ETFs. Graphical analysis and 
summary statistics acutely show that March was the month represented by numerous events 
that led to market disruptions. The VIX index reached its new record high. Until the Fed's 
intervention, equity and bond ETFs' returns were under severe pressure, reducing the dollar 
amount of assets under management across funds substantially.  
Second, I inspect the impact on ETFs depending on the development of the covid-19 
crisis, considering the buildup phase as of February 2020, the outbreak phase as the period until 
March 13, and the peak phase until April.  The returns were mostly harmed in the outbreak 
phase, suggesting that investors only accounted for the slowdown until reasonably late in the 
crisis. I also incorporate information about Federal Reserve intervention by considering the 
following periods: the crisis phase from February 2020 till March 23, the first response period 
until April 9, and the second response period until May. The findings show that returns 
increased more after the first announcement of the Fed's intervention than after the second 
announcement, although the dollar amount of the support was higher for the second response.  
It could be possibly explained by the novelty of those unexpected actions that gave extra 
confidence to investors. 
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Regarding the timing of the events on flows, I consider a bit less granular split of 
subperiods due to the data's generality, referring to the buildup phase for February and the peak 
phase for March. The analysis revealed that the funds with more illiquid underlying assets 
tended to experience lower flows and showed that foreign ETFs' flows survived relatively well 
during the build phase suggesting that the investors first started to pull out money from the US-
focused funds. Furthermore, I document that the Federal reserve interventions gave a significant 
boost for the markets and flows, not only to the directly affected investment-grade ETFs but 
also funds across all the asset classes.   
During this crisis, ETFs proved their resiliency aside from the numerous speculations. 
However, the unique Federal Reserve intervention cannot be expected as a common practice in 
the future. Thus, it is not straightforward that ETFs would perform equally well without support. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the used resources and 
introduces the data. Section 3 motivates the analysis and forms hypotheses. Section 4 shows 
the main findings of ETF's resiliency and performance in the covid-19 crisis documenting 
differences across fund types. Section 5 describes the limitations and gives recommendations 
for future studies. Section 6 discusses the findings of the analysis and concludes the research 
paper. 
 
2.    DATA 
This section describes the procedure of sample construction and introduces the data. Definitions 
of all critical variables are in Appendix A. All the tables and figures illustrating the data are in 
Appendix B. 
 
Fund characteristics, flows, and performance 
The primary data source is quarterly fund characteristics, daily time-series of returns and net 
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asset value (NAV), and monthly time-series of returns, NAV, and total net asset value (TNA). 
I retrieved the data from the CRSP Mutual Funds database through the Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS) platform, first for fund characteristics data by filtering on the search query 
for the ETF universe (et_flag = F, where F = ETF) and choosing the dates between January 
2015 and September 2020. The outcome is sample data for 2,747 unique ETFs, resulting in 
33,363 quarterly fund observations. The sample consists of 2,213 equity and 534 bond funds 
allowing a comparison of investors' behavior across different fund types that follow previous 
literature (e.g., Jiang and Zheng 2015). Then, I created a list with unique fund identifiers and 
retrieved two databases with fund data on daily returns and monthly returns, TNA and NAV 
between 2015 and September 2020 for 2,451 distinctive funds, giving 2,564,492 daily 123,255 
monthly fund observations. I supplement the data with VIX closing prices as a proxy for 
volatility retrieved from Yahoo Finance between 2015 and September 2020, resulting in 1,446 
daily observations.  
The primary response variables are ETF flows and performance. Following prior 
literature on mutual funds (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison 1997), I compute the net cash flow from 
the total net assets between two consecutive periods and the interim fund return. I estimate fund 
flows as net cash flow percentage growth; in particular, for fund k in month t flow is defined in 
the following way: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠!,# =
𝑇𝑁𝐴!,# −	𝑇𝑁𝐴!,#$%,1 + 𝑅!,#0
𝑇𝑁𝐴!,#$%
 
where, 𝑇𝑁𝐴!,# is the total net asset value of fund i at the end of month t and 𝑅!,# is the return of 
fund i during month t. The daily fund returns measure fund performance. I calculate returns as 





= − 1 
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where, 𝑁𝐴𝑉!,# is the net asset value of fund i at the end of day t, 𝑁𝐴𝑉!,#$% is the net asset value 
of fund i up to three periods before t, and 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡 is a total adjustment factor for each day the 
fund trades and each dividend. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the main descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of the 
dependable variables and key regressors, split by the full sample (Panel A) and a restrained 
sample covering dates from 2019 to 2020 (Panel B). Over the full sample period, ETFs recorded 
average monthly returns of 0.42% and flows of 5.05%, while during the restrained sample, 
returns of 0.82% and flows of 2.1%. On average, a fund held $1.8 billion and $2 billion net 
assets during the full and restrained period, respectively. On average, over the full sample 
period, ETFs had an expense ratio of 0.49%, turnover ratio of 63.6%, and a quarterly yield of 
0.49%, while during the restrained period, 0.46%, 66.25%, and 0.49%, respectively. An average 
fund family has approximately 150 ETF funds. 
 
ETF Fund Types 
The CRSP database has its codes for each ETF consisting of up to four characters that identify 
fund characteristics and allowing to group funds by their types. Every consecutive character 
has an increasing granularity. Based on The CRSP Style Code guide, I grouped the funds based 
on the CRSP Levels 1, 2, and 4, focusing on geographies. Table 2 summarizes the results and 
shows ETFs' evolution by types from January 2015 to September 2020. In September 2020, 
there were 1,534 equity ETFs, out of which 1,019 focused on the US, 87 on Emerging Market, 
62 on the EU region, and 32 on China, among others. Within the sample, the number of fixed 
income ETFs grew by over 60% during the last five years, reaching 394 in September 2020. 
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Within fixed-income ETFs, corporate funds have developed the most, almost quadrupling the 
number of funds over the last five years. 
 
3.   MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES 
Equity markets were under severe stress in March 2020. As shown in Figure 1, VIX, the so-
called fear index, reached its record high of 82.69 on March 16, surpassing the peak level from 
the last financial crisis in October 2008. As economies were shutting down, the demand for 
petrol collapsed, and on April 20, the price of WTI crude oil slumped into negative territory for 
the first time in history and traded at -$37.63 per barrel. Neither the corporate bond market was 
left untouched. Measured by BofA US Corporate Index Option-Adjusted Spread and BofA US 
High-Yield Index Option-Adjusted Spread indexes, spreads of investment-grade and high-yield 
bonds widened sharply in early March. They reached the peak on March 23, of 401 and 1,087 
bps, respectively. Even though the spreads almost quadrupled for investment-grade bonds and 
nearly tripled for high-yield bonds compared to the pre-pandemic levels, they did not reach the 
2008 financial crisis levels. Also, as reported widely (e.g., BlackRock 2020 or Haddad, Moreira 
and Muir 2020), during the height of volatility, bond ETFs had large price discounts to their 
corresponding NAVs, including ETFs that have a matched mutual fund.  
On March 23, as there was no doubt about hardship worldwide triggered by the covid-19 
crisis, Federal Reserve announced unprecedented direct measures to support the US economy 
during those challenging times to calm the markets. The Fed established two facilities, the 
Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) and the Secondary Market Corporate 
Credit Facility (SMCCF), with the purpose of direct purchasing of investment-grade bonds in 
the primary and secondary markets in order to provide the much-needed liquidity. The Fed took 
both sides of the market, ensuring investors can raise cash whenever they want. The US central 
bank accomplished it by trading ETFs, as it would be more troublesome to buy individual bonds 
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than stocks. After the substantial public support, spreads stabilized. On April 9, Federal Reserve 
announced extensions to the previously mentioned plan to increase the capacity to $850 billion 
(from less than $300 billion) and include high-yield bonds if they were investment-grade rated 
on March 22.  
All those events led to the formulation of the following three main hypotheses of the 
study. First, I hypothesize that the crisis's intensity is negatively correlated with investors’ 
confidence and fund performance; thus, ETFs will experience worse returns as the covid-19 
evolves. Second, I hypothesize that investors worried about the potential structural fragility 
during times of market stress will opt-out from investments in the ETFs with illiquid underlying 
assets; thus, those funds will be more prone to outflows than funds with liquid underlying assets 
during the covid-19 crisis. Third, I hypothesize that funds directly affected by the policy 
measures will benefit more than the rest; thus, the Federal Reserve interventions will boost the 
returns and flows of investment-grade ETFs the most.   
 
4.    ASSESSMENT OF ETF RESILIENCY 
This section sizes up fund resiliency to the covid-19 crisis using daily and monthly time-series 
data on ETFs. March 2020 was a striking month for markets represented by strong negative 
returns and shrinking values of assets under management of ETFs across all asset classes, and 
negative flows across bond ETFs. The disruptions were not sustained for long, as the Fed 
interventions effectively relieved the funds' stress.  
 
Graphical Analysis 
Table 2 reveals that during the last five years, the number of ETFs available in the market 
increased year over year, but during the first quarter of 2020, there were more funds liquidated 
than created. Liquidations of equity funds mainly led it while the offering of bond ETFs has 
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broadened. Nevertheless, those liquidations had not much to do with the increased volatility in 
the market, but with the acquisitions of ETF families of OppenheimerFunds and Guggenheim 
Partners by Invesco, one of the biggest fund providers, which created redundant funds.  
As shown in Figure 2, in March 2020, treasury and municipal bond ETFs experienced 
severe aggregated net cash outflows, and investors pulled out in total $19.5 billion and $2.4 
billion, respectively. Nevertheless, treasury ETFs' negative trend did not last long as already in 
April, the outflows were neutralized by a net cash inflow of $19.8 billion. Regarding monthly 
flows, as Figure 3 demonstrates, the month of March 2020 stands out again. An average bond 
ETF had negative flows, while during the consecutive month, treasury ETFs already picked-
up. Municipal bond ETFs had positive flows only starting in May. This figure also shows that, 
on average, equity ETFs sustained positive flows throughout the whole period of interest and 
 
Figure 3. Average Flows for ETFs by Asset Class 
 
This figure plots a monthly evolution of average flows for ETFs of three asset classes: 
Equity, Municipal Bonds, and Treasury. The time period is September 2019 to September 
2020.  It is a proprietary elaboration based on the estimation of flows from the monthly Total 
Net Asset Value, returns data, and fund characteristics data from the CRSP Fund Mutual 
database. Flow averages do not include funds that were created after Q3 2018. 
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had experienced higher average flows in the months following the Fed intervention than during 
pre-pandemic times.  
Figure 4 demonstrates that cumulative returns started to deteriorate as the pandemic 
evolved, and a first sharp drop in returns occurred for equity ETFs in mid-February 2020. Bond 
ETFs experienced the adverse trend a bit later, starting at the beginning of March and reaching 
their lowest point just before the first direct Federal Reserve intervention of March 23. The 
returns of equity ETFs suffered more than bond ETFs as their weighted cumulative return 
surpassed -26% since September 2020, compared to treasury ETFs which nearly reached -5% 
over the same period. After March 23, ETFs' returns across all asset classes hiked, and around 
May, they reached their pre-pandemic levels. In the following months, ETFs experienced a rally 




Figure 4. Weighted Cumulative Returns for ETFs by Asset Class 
 
This figure plots a daily time-series of weighted cumulative returns for ETFs of three asset 
classes: Equity, Municipal Bonds, and Treasury. The time period is September 2019 to 
September 2020.  It is a proprietary elaboration based on the daily returns and fund 
characteristics data from the CRSP Fund Mutual database. The cumulative returns are 
calculated since September 2019. For simplicity, the weights were calculated using the Total 
Net Asset Value of each fund at the end of Q3 2019. 
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Figure 5 that plots a time-series of the average net asset value of ETFs by asset class, 
shows similar findings as to the cumulative returns. An average equity ETF reached the pre-
pandemic highest NAV on February 2, 2020, of $54.73 while treasury ETF on March 6 of 
$49.83 and reached their minimums of $36.13 on March 23 and $45.02 on March 13, 
respectively. Thus, equity ETFs' value took a more prominent and more prolonged hit than the 
treasury ETFs. 
Figure 6 represents a time-series of average ETFs assets under management and also 
shows similar dynamics to cumulative returns. On average, the AUM of equity ETFs started to 
decrease in February and reached its low in March, while for treasury ETFs the decrease 
occurred only in March. For municipal bond ETFs, the drop started in March and sustained 
over April. In May, the average AUM picked up again, and by the end of August, the total 
AUM of ETFs overpassed the pre-pandemic levels. When looking at the top movers in terms 
of AUM during the first quarter of 2020, high-yield funds were the top losers for both treasury 
and municipal bond ETF funds (Figure 7 and 8). Across equity ETFs (Figure 9), energy and 
financial services ETFs were among the top losers in Q1 2020 and lost more than half of AUM 
during that quarter. Those shocks portray the magnitude of the hit that these industries had taken 
during the covid-19 crisis. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Additionally to the graphical analysis, I take a more formal approach to assess ETFs' resiliency 
under the shock caused by the covid-19 crisis by performing regression analysis on the 
restrained sample covering the period from January 2019 to September 2020. ETFs created 
after the third quarter of 2018 are excluded from the sample to reduce the noise coming from 
newly created funds. I use a linear model with fixed effects for a month to eliminate omitted 
variable bias caused by excluding unobserved variables that evolve over time but are constant 
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across funds. Also, the regressions include controls for fund characteristics, covering the fund's 
NAV, expense ratio, turnover ratio, family count, and as well as lagged periods returns. To 
assess the impact of the crisis's evolution and the Fed intervention, I create dummies for 
different periods following standard categorization across the literature (e.g., Falato, Goldstein 
and Hortaçsu 2020). Also, I create additional dummy variables for different fund types and 
geographical focus.   
Firstly, I ran regressions on the monthly flow data. The following equation represents the 
principal regression:  
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠!,# =	𝛽% × 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠!,# +	𝛽& × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +	𝛽' × 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽( × 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽) × 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽* × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽+ × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽, × 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
+ 𝛽- × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽%. × 𝑋!,# +	𝛽%% × 𝜀!,# 
where, the dependent variable, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠!,#, is a monthly flow for fund 𝑖 in period 𝑡, and the 
independent variable, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠!,#, is the total monthly return for fund 𝑖 in period 𝑡. The main 
variables of interest, Crisis dummy variable for February and March, and the Response dummy 
for April and May, the period following the first Federal Reserve intervention. Equity and Bond 
are dummies that equal one for an equity ETF and bond ETF, respectively. Foreign Equity and 
Foreign Bond are dummies that equal one for equity and bond ETFs that are not US-focused, 
respectively. There are two dummies within bond ETFs, High Yield that equals one for high-
yield ETFs, and Investment Grade for investment-grade ETFs. 𝑋!,# is a vector of controls for 
the fund characteristics and lagged returns. The idiosyncratic error term is denoted as 𝜀!,#. I 
complement this regression by including interactions between the indicators for the covid-19 
crisis and the Federal Reserve response and different fund types. Complete regression result 
summaries are in Table 3. 
(1) 
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Then, I repeat the process by exchanging two dummies, Crisis, and Response for 
indicators of the pandemic's evolution. The equation is as the following: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠!,# =	𝛽% × 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠!,# +	𝛽& × 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑢𝑝 +	𝛽' × 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 + 𝛽( × 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽) × 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽* × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽+ × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽, × 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
+ 𝛽- × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽%. × 𝑋!,# +	𝛽%% × 𝜀!,# 
where, the dependent variable, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠!,#, is a monthly flow for fund 𝑖 in period 𝑡, the main 
variables of interest, Buildup, and Peak dummies, are subperiods of the covid-19 crisis. Buildup 
is an indicator for February 2020, and Peak for March 2020. The other variables have the same 
interpretation as in equation (1). I ran an additional regression using the same variables but 
adding interactions between the indicators for the evolution of the covid-19 crisis and the 
different types of funds to assess marginal effects.  Complete regression result summaries are 
in Table 4. 
Secondly, I ran an analogical set of regressions but on returns instead of flows and using 
daily observations. The data's additional granularity allows further split between specific fed 
announcements and decomposition of the covid-19 crisis evolution indicators. The baseline 
equation is as the following: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠!,# =	𝛽% × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +	𝛽& × 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡	𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 +	𝛽' × 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑	𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒
+ 𝛽( × 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽) × 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽* × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽+ × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽, × 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽- × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽%. × 𝑋!,# +	𝛽%% × 𝜀!,# 
where, the dependable variable, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠!,#, is the total daily return for fund 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 
including the reinvested dividends and net of management expenses and 12-b fees. Crisis is a 
dummy for February until March 23, 2020, the first Federal Reserve announcement of the direct 
intervention. First Response is an indicator for the period between March 23 and the second 




2020. The other variables have the same interpretation as in equation (1). Also, I compliment 
this regression with another one by including interactions between indicators for the covid-19 
crisis, federal reserve responses, and different fund types. Complete regression result 
summaries are in Table 5. 
Then, I repeat the process as in the regressions on flows, but with decomposed Peak 
variable for Outbreak and Peak. The equation is the following: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠!,# =	𝛽% × 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑢𝑝 +	𝛽& × 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 +	𝛽' × 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 + 𝛽( × 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽) × 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽* × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽+ × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽, × 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
+ 𝛽- × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽%. × 𝑋!,# +	𝛽%% × 𝜀!,# 
where, the dependable variable, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠!,#, is the total daily return for fund 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 
including reinvested dividends and net of management expenses and 12-b fees. The specific 
subperiods of the evolution of the covid-19 crisis are the following: Buildup dummy for 
February 2020, Outbreak for March 1, 2020, to March 13, 2020, that is, the day when WHO 
announced pandemic, and Peak for March 13, 2020, to April 2020. The other variables have 
the same interpretation as in equation (1). Also, I compliment this regression with another one 
by including interactions between indicators for subperiods of the covid-19 crisis and different 
fund types. Complete regression result summaries are in Table 6. 
 
The impact on flows  
Table 3 presents the estimation of the impact of the covid-19 crisis and the Fed’s response on 
fund flows. In line with visual evidence, the coefficient on Crisis for fund flows, in the 
regression without interactions is negative. Also, the marginal effect of the crisis on both equity 
and bond ETFs is negative, with a more noticeable impact on bonds consistent with graphical 
representations. Nevertheless, those results are not statistically significant, thus only suggesting 
(4) 
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that there was a trend that an average ETF experienced outflows due to the covid-19 crisis and 
that the effect was more substantial for funds with more illiquid underlying assets. During the 
crisis, both equity and bond ETFs with non-US focus had suffered more in terms of flows than 
the funds with US focus as the coefficients on interaction terms between Crisis and Foreign 
Bond and Foreign Equity are negative. However, the results are statistically significant only for 
equity funds. Monthly flows of foreign equity ETFs, on average, decreased by 2.2% compared 
to the ETFs with US-focus during the crisis period. The flows of investment-grade ETFs tended 
to endure relatively well during the crisis, as the interaction term's coefficient between 
Investment Grade and Crisis is positive. Simultaneously, on the riskier end of the spectrum of 
Table 3. Impact of Crisis and Fed Response on Fund Flows 
 
This table reports the main results of an analysis of monthly flows regressed on indicator 
variables for the covid-19 crisis and the Federal Reserve response, without (1) and with 
interactions (2) among those indicators and different ETF types (Equity, Bond, Foreign Equity, 
Foreign Bond, High Yield, and Investment Grade). Both regressions include controls for the 
key fund characteristics (fund family count, expense ratio, and turn ratio), returns and lagged 
returns, and nav. The time period is January 2019 – September 2020. All specifications include 
controls for a month. Clustered Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All variables descriptions are in 
Appendix A. Complete regression results are in Appendix B. 
 
 Flows 
 Without interaction With interaction 
 (1) (2) 
Crisis (Feb-Mar, 2020) -0.010 (0.007) 0.009 (0.021) 
Response (Apr-May, 2020) 0.026* (0.014) 0.178** (0.072) 
Equity*Crisis  -0.007 (0.021) 
Equity*Response  -0.137* (0.074) 
Bond*Crisis  -0.022 (0.031) 
Bond*Response  -0.144 (0.094) 
Foreign Equity*Crisis  -0.022* (0.012) 
Foreign Equity*Response  -0.068** (0.031) 
Foreign Bond*Crisis  -0.027 (0.028) 
Foreign Bond*Response  -0.024 (0.075) 
Investment Grade*Crisis  0.023 (0.044) 
Investment Grade*Response  0.003 (0.108) 
High Yield*Crisis  -0.010 (0.035) 
High Yield*Response  -0.029 (0.099) 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 27,968 27,968 




fixed income, high-yield ETFs had a tendency to be affected to a greater extent compared to 
other types of bond ETFs.  
In line with the Fed's intentions to boost the market, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on Response shows signs of the policy measures' effectiveness. The 
coefficient implies that monthly fund flows increased by 2.6% during the Federal Response 
period, which is more than the average monthly fund flows over the restrained period. When 
looking directly into the specific types of funds that the Fed addressed, the regressions do not 
show that investment-grade ETFs were the ones that benefited more from the public support 
even though they were the ones addressed by the facilities. 
Table 4. Impact of the Evolution of Crisis on Fund Flows 
 
This table reports the results of an analysis of monthly flows regressed on indicator variables 
for different stages of the covid-19 crisis, without (1) and with interactions (2) among those 
indicators and different ETF types (Equity, Bond, Foreign Equity, Foreign Bond, High Yield, 
and Investment Grade). Both regressions include controls for the key fund characteristics (fund 
family count, expense ratio, and turn ratio), returns and lagged returns, and nav. The time 
period is January 2019 – September 2020. All specifications include controls for a 
month. Clustered Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 




 Without interaction With interaction 
 (1) (2) 
Buildup (Feb, 2020) -0.015 (0.010) 0.049* (0.028) 
Peak (Mar, 2020) -0.005 (0.010) -0.035 (0.028) 
Equity*Buildup  -0.077*** (0.029) 
Equity*Peak  0.065** (0.029) 
Bond* Buildup  -0.060 (0.042) 
Bond*Peak  0.019 (0.043) 
Foreign Equity*Buildup  0.023 (0.017) 
Foreign Equity*Peak  -0.064*** (0.017) 
Foreign Bond*Buildup  -0.012 (0.039) 
Foreign Bond*Peak  -0.042 (0.039) 
Investment Grade* Buildup  0.009 (0.060) 
Investment Grade*Peak  0.037 (0.061) 
High Yield* Buildup  -0.024 (0.048) 
High Yield*Peak  0.006 (0.049) 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 27,968 27,968 
R2 0.001 0.003 
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Table 4 presents the estimation of the impact of different stages of the evolution of the 
covid-19 crisis on fund flows. The regression without interaction shows that, in general, during 
the buildup and peak phase, ETF flows suffered as both coefficients are negative, but the results 
are not statistically significant. When looking into more details at the regression with 
interactions and evaluating the evolution of the crisis, the buildup phase harmed bond and 
equity ETFs flows as the coefficients of the interaction terms on Bond and Buildup, and Equity 
and Buildup are negative. Also, the effect is slightly more substantial for equity ETFs. The 
overall effect on the peak phase for bond ETFs was even more notable than during the buildup 
phase, but the results are not statistically significant, suggesting only a trend. On the other hand, 
the peak phase had an overall positive effect on equity flows. It is in line with the graphical 
analysis findings for equity ETFs flows, which revealed that this fund type had positive average 
flows during the covid-19 crisis and picked up the momentum in the peak phase. The positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of Peak and Equity additionally 
validates those findings.  
Focusing on foreign ETFs, for both equity and bond, there is a trend that flows stood up 
well in the buildup phase, and investors started to pull out money only in the peak phase. 
However, the evidence is statistically significant only for foreign equity ETFs in the peak phase. 
It suggests that investors first pulled out money from the US-focused ETFs and then from the 
foreign-focused ones.  
 
Impact on returns  
Table 5 presents the estimation of the impact of the covid-19 crisis and the Fed’s responses on 
fund returns. In line with visual evidence, in the regression without interactions, the coefficient 
on Crisis is negative and highly statistically significant, providing an additional indication that 
the pandemic had disrupted funds' performance. The coefficient implies that the daily returns 
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for an average fund during the crisis period decreased by 1.1%, which is substantially more 
than the average of fund returns over the restrained period of 0.04%.  The coefficients on the 
interaction terms of Bond and Crisis, and Equity and Crisis, imply that the marginal effect of 
the covid-19 crisis increased returns of bond ETFs by 0.7% and decreased returns of equity 
funds by 0.2% compared to other types of ETFs. Both marginal effects of Crisis on Foreign 
Table 5. Impact of Crisis and Fed Response on Fund Returns 
 
This table reports the results of an analysis of daily returns regressed on indicator variables 
for the covid-19 crisis and indicators for two Federal Reserve response, without (1) and with 
interactions (2) among those indicators and different ETF types (Equity, Bond, Foreign 
Equity, Foreign Bond, High Yield, and Investment Grade). All the regressions include 
controls for the key fund characteristics (fund family count, expense ratio, and turn ratio), 
returns and lagged returns and nav. The time period is January 2019 – September 2020. All 
specifications include controls for a month. Clustered Standard Errors are reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All 
variables are described in Appendix A. Complete regression results are in Appendix B. 
 
 Returns 
 Without interaction With interaction 
 (1) (2) 
Crisis (Feb-Mar 23, 2020) -0.011*** (0.0001) -0.010*** (0.0003) 
First Response (Mar 23-Apr 9, 2020) 0.013*** (0.0001) 0.011*** (0.0005) 
Second Response (Apr 9-May, 2020) 0.004*** (0.0001) 0.004*** (0.0003) 
Equity*Crisis  -0.002*** (0.0003) 
Equity*First Response  0.004*** (0.001) 
Equity*Second Response  0.0001 (0.0003) 
Bond*Crisis  0.007*** (0.0005) 
Bond*First Response  -0.006*** (0.001) 
Bond*Second Response  -0.002*** (0.0005) 
Foreign Equity*Crisis  -0.0005** (0.0002) 
Foreign Equity*First Response  -0.003*** (0.0003) 
Foreign Equity*Second Response  -0.0005** (0.0002) 
Foreign Bond*Crisis  -0.002*** (0.0005) 
Foreign Bond*First Response  0.001** (0.001) 
Foreign Bond*Second Response  0.001 (0.0005) 
Investment Grade*Crisis  0.002*** (0.001) 
Investment Grade*First Response  -0.003** (0.001) 
Investment Grade*Second Response  -0.0003 (0.001) 
High Yield*Crisis  -0.003*** (0.001) 
High Yield*First Response  0.003*** (0.001) 
High Yield*Second Response  0.0003 (0.001) 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 835,541 835,541 
R2 0.079 0.081 
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Equity and Foreign Bonds are adverse and statistically significant, implying respective average 
daily fund returns decrease of 0.05% and 0.2% compared to US-focused funds.  
Both Federal Reserve direct interventions, as intended, gave a boost to the performance 
of ETFs as the coefficient for the First Response and Second Response are positive and highly 
statistically significant. The coefficient on the First Response dummy implies that, on average, 
daily fund returns increased by 1.3%, while the coefficient on Second Response implies an 
Table 6. Impact of the Evolution of Crisis on Fund Returns 
 
This table reports the results of an analysis of daily returns regressed on indicator variables 
for different stages of the Covid-19 crisis, without (1) and with interactions (2) among those 
indicators and different ETF types (Equity, Bond, Foreign Equity, Foreign Bond, High 
Yield, and Investment Grade). All the regressions include controls for the key fund 
characteristics (fund family count, expense ratio, and turn ratio), returns and lagged returns, 
and nav. The time period is January 2019 – September 2020. All specifications include 
controls for a month. Clustered Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All variables are described in 
Appendix A. Complete regression results are in Appendix B. 
 
 Returns 
 Without interaction With interaction 
 (1) (2) 
Buildup (Feb, 2020) -0.004*** (0.0001) -0.004*** (0.0004) 
Outbreak (Mar 1-13, 2020) -0.011*** (0.0002) -0.011*** (0.001) 
Peak (Mar 13-Apr, 2020) 0.002*** (0.0001) 0.001*** (0.0003) 
Equity*Buildup  -0.001*** (0.0004) 
Equity*Outbreak  -0.001 (0.001) 
Equity*Peak  0.001* (0.0003) 
Bond* Buildup  0.004*** (0.001) 
Bond*Outbreak  0.010*** (0.001) 
Bond*Peak  -0.002*** (0.001) 
Foreign Equity*Buildup  -0.00001 (0.0003) 
Foreign Equity*Outbreak  -0.004*** (0.0004) 
Foreign Equity*Peak  -0.0003 (0.0002) 
Foreign Bond*Buildup  -0.001* (0.001) 
Foreign Bond*Outbreak  -0.002*** (0.001) 
Foreign Bond*Peak  0.0001 (0.0005) 
Investment Grade* Buildup  0.001 (0.001) 
Investment Grade*Outbreak  0.003** (0.001) 
Investment Grade*Peak  -0.0001 (0.001) 
High Yield* Buildup  -0.001 (0.001) 
High Yield*Outbreak  -0.004*** (0.001) 
High Yield*Peak  -0.001 (0.001) 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 835,541 835,541 












increase of 0.4% compared to an average of fund returns over the restrained period of 0.04%. 
Therefore, the first shock was firmer, even though the second support's dollar amount was more 
generous than the first support. Surprisingly, the first response had a more positive effect on 
high-yield ETFs' performance than on investment-grade ETFs, even though the intervention 
fully covered only investment-grade ETFs. Indeed, the coefficients imply that on average, 
between the first and the second response, daily returns of an investment-grade ETF decreased 
by 0.3% and of high-yield ETF increased by 0.3% compared to the other types of bond ETFs. 
The Second Response had a similar effect on both high-yield and investment-grade ETFs, but 
the results are not statistically significant. 
Table 6 presents the estimation of the impact of different stages of evolution of the covid-
19 crisis on fund returns. Throughout the pandemic, the returns started to suffer already in the 
buildup period and further intensified in the outbreak phase. Both coefficients on Buildup and 
Outbreak are negative and highly statistically significant. On average, daily fund returns 
decreased by 0.4% during the buildup period, while in the outbreak period by 1.1%, which is 
strongly inferior compared to the average daily return of 0.04% over the restrained period. It 
shows that the performance started to suffer only once the reports of confirmed cases 
intensified, and the outbreak of the pandemic was inevitable. Nevertheless, the coefficient on 
Peak is positive and implies that, on average, fund returns increased by 0.2% during the peak 
phase compared to the average return over the restrained period. During the outbreak phase, the 
effect was even more substantial in the case of foreign-focused ETFs. For both, equity and bond 
ETFs the coefficients are statistically significant.  
Complementary to the findings from the graphical analysis, the regressions with 
interactions provide additional evidence that the performance of bond ETFs did not suffer a 
much as equity ETFs as the marginal effects of the buildup and outbreak phases are slightly 
positive, while the overall effect of those phases on bond ETFs is still negative and statistically 
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significant. For example, the coefficients on the interaction terms between Bond and Buildup, 
and Equity and Build, imply that, on average, during the buildup phase, daily returns of bond 
ETFs were higher by 0.4% while of equity ETF were lower by 0.1% compared to other ETF 
types. Throughout all the crisis phases, the bonds on the riskier end of the spectrum were 
suffering the most, while investment-grade ETFs returns prospered relatively well. For 
example, coefficients on the interaction terms of High Yield and Outbreak, and Investment 
Grade and Outbreak, imply that, during the outbreak phase, returns of an average high-yield 
ETF decreased by 0.4%, while investment-grade ETFs increased by 0.3% compared to the other 
bond ETF types. 
 
5.    LIMITATIONS 
The first major drawback of the research is the generality of the total net assets data that limits 
the estimation of flows to monthly observations. The recent literature revealed that the market 
disruptions disappeared as fast as they appeared (e.g., Haddad, Moreira and Muir 2020). Thus, 
monthly data only allows showing the smoothed-out effects without capturing the short-sighted 
impact. Also, more observations might have improved the data's explanatory power and add 
additional statistical significance to the regressions.  
Secondly, this study only allowed to assess the short-term impact (up to 6 months) of the 
crisis and unprecedented governmental intervention. Due to the novelty of these events, it was 
impossible to show the long-term effect on ETFs. 
That is why I encourage researchers to perform a similar study in the future to include 
more granular data on flows and a longer time frame after the covid-19 crisis. It would allow 
to picture the impacts of specific events and assess the pandemic evolution's long-term effects 
and unprecedented governmental support. 
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6.    DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Working with data on fund flows, performance, and characteristics, and using the covid-19 
crisis as the laboratory of the market stress, I evaluated different interdependencies depending 
on fund types. The visual evidence and results from regressions clearly showed that the markets 
tumbled when reports related to the covid-19 pandemic intensified. The returns of ETFs took a 
big hit, especially during the outbreak phase in early March 2020. The regression results' 
significance provides evidence that ETFs' performance suffered more as the pandemic 
intensified and bond ETFs were the least affected fund type. After the WHO declaration of the 
pandemic, the ETFs returns stood up relatively well, suggesting that investors already 
accounted for the impacts of the covid-19 crisis. 
Despite many concerns among theoreticians and practitioners about ETFs' fragility, they 
proved their resiliency even during significant market stress. Although returns were suffering, 
there was high volatility and uncertainty in the market; investors put more money into equity 
ETFs during the pandemic. As expected, the regression results imply that there was a trend that 
funds with more illiquid underlying assets were more prone to negative flows compared to the 
funds with liquid underlying assets. 
The unprecedented Federal Reserve interventions played a material role in providing 
liquidity for ETFs and significantly boosted the financial markets. Although, the regression 
results do not show evidence that funds directly affected by the Fed intervention were the ones 
that benefited the most. It could be explained that the extra boost occurred only just after the 
intervention, which cannot be explained by the regressions. 
The Authorized Participants lived up to their responsibilities and provided liquidity, 
including bond ETFs, which underlying assets were very illiquid or even halted trading. Despite 
the challenging conditions, bond ETFs play an increasingly important role in markets as 
investors are putting billions into those funds this year. The increased interest in bond ETFs led 
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to the emergence of new funds built on bonds and mixed strategies comprised of bonds and 
equities. 
Nevertheless, the public measures addressed to stabilize the market were unprecedented, 
and it is not expected that they become the new normal. That is why, when thinking about 
implications for those events, it cannot be confirmed that the structural fragilities of ETFs are 
fully resilient to those stress tests.  
Undoubtedly, ETFs are one of the most prominent financial innovations of the last 
decades. They have attracted investors from all around the world, providing an easy and cost-
effective way to invest money across all main asset-classes and many subgroups spanning all 
geographies. Private and public investors appreciated ETFs' benefits as the Fed used them as 
an intermediary to accomplish their goal of boosting the market.  The research showed evidence 
that markets were under severe stress during the covid-19 pandemic, where equity ETFs were 
more prone to more significant swings in returns. At the same time, there was a tendency that 
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APPENDIX A  
 
The variables in this research paper are extracted from four central databases for January 2015 
to September 2020 for ETF funds: daily net assets and returns from CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database, monthly total net assets and returns from the CRSP Mutual Fund database, 
quarterly fund characteristic from the CRSP Mutual Fund database, and daily VIX data from 
Yahoo Finance. 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
Flows [%]. Is defined as: 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠!,# =
/01!,#$	/01!,#$%3%45!,#6
/01!,#$%
, where 𝑇𝑁𝐴!,# in total net assets in 
period t, 𝑇𝑁𝐴!,#$% is total net assets in the previous period, 𝑅!,# is the return over the period t. 
Returns [%]. Is the total return per share defined as: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠!,# = V
017!,#∗9:;<=9#
017!,#$%
W − 1, 
where 𝑁𝐴𝑉!,# is the net asset value of fund i at the end of day t, 𝑁𝐴𝑉!,#$% is the net asset value 
of fund i up to three periods before t, and 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡 is a total adjustment factor for each day the 
fund trades and each dividend. 
Net cash flow [$]. Is defined as: 𝑁𝐶𝐹!,# = 𝑇𝑁𝐴!,# −	𝑇𝑁𝐴!,#$%,1 + 𝑅!,#0, where 𝑇𝑁𝐴!,# in 
total net assets in period t, 𝑇𝑁𝐴!,#$% is total net assets in the previous period, 𝑅!,# is the return 
over the period t. 
Net Asset Value [$]. Is the value of fund’s underlying assets minus its liabilities divided by 
the number of shares outstanding. 
Expense Ratio. Is the ratio of fund’s operating expenses to total investment of shareholders. 
Turnover Ratio. Minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities divided 
by the average 12-month total net assets of a fund. 
Yield. Is income yield defined as the ratio of income distributions and NAV. 
Family Count. Is the total number of funds that belong to the fund provider family. 







Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
This table describes statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the critical variables over the 
full sample (Panel A) and restrained sample (Panel B). It is a proprietary elaboration based on 
the data from the CRSP Fund Mutual database. Flows averages do not include funds that were 
created after the third quarter of 2018. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics: Full Sample (2015-2020)  
mean std 
   
Daily NAV [$] 45.740 35.805 
Daily Returns [%] 0.023 1.864 
Monthly NAV [$] 45.652 35.742 
Monthly Returns [%] 0.415 7.642 
Monthly Total Net Assets [mln $] 1765.006 8941.019 
Flows [%]* 5.051 196.046 
Quarterly Yield [%] 0.485 0.513 
Expense Fee [%] 0.485 0.289 
Turnover Ratio [%] 63.601 184.811 
Family Count 151.716 134.155 
VIX 17.125 8.204 
Panel B: Summary Statistics: Restrained Sample (2019-2020) 
 mean std 
   
Daily NAV [$] 45.093 37.966 
Daily Returns [%] 0.044 2.469 
Monthly NAV [$] 45.196 38.113 
Monthly Returns [%] 0.817 10.002 
Monthly Total Net Assets [mln $] 1983.884 10277.742 
Flows [%]* 2.095 28.212 
Quarterly Yield [%] 0.493 0.487 
Expense Ratio [%] 0.464 0.282 
Turnover Ratio [%] 66.253 191.959 
Family Count 150.586 136.261 




Table 2. Distribution of Unique ETFs by Fund Category and Regional Focus 
 
This table shows the distribution of ETF counts per fund category and their geographical focus 
from 2015 to 2020 yearly, and for 2020 quarterly. It is a proprietary elaboration based on the 
























Equity Domestic US 714 794 881 956 1004 1006 1012 1019 
Foreign China 26 26 32 36 34 32 31 32 
EM Emerging 
Markets 
81 81 89 95 95 90 88 87 
EU European 
Region 
69 71 76 75 71 70 68 62 
India 15 17 19 23 22 21 21 21 
Japan 22 20 20 21 22 22 21 18 
Latin America 16 16 17 18 18 18 18 17 
No regional 
focus 
178 201 217 255 270 264 270 257 
Pacific Ex 
Japan 
19 16 16 16 12 12 11 9 
Pacific In 
Japan 
9 15 15 14 14 13 13 12 
           
Subtotal   1149 1257 1382 1509 1562 1548 1553 1534 
Fixed Income Corporate No regional 
focus 
13 36 42 41 48 48 49 49 
Foreign Foreign 27 30 32 43 47 43 43 43 
Government US 40 42 45 46 46 56 58 59 
Muni US 30 28 35 44 57 57 57 56 
Other No regional 
focus 
134 126 147 179 190 188 185 187 
           
Subtotal   244 262 301 353 388 392 392 394 
Mixed FI & 
Equity 
Other No regional 
focus 
40 47 59 64 66 67 70 73 
Other Currency No regional 
focus 
17 16 12 12 11 11 10 10 
Mortgage-backed US 13 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 
Other No regional 
focus 
25 40 32 39 88 96 105 120 
           
Subtotal   55 70 60 67 115 123 131 146 
           
Total 
  
1488 1636 1800 1991 2131 2130 2146 2147 
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Table 3. Impact of Crisis and Fed Response on Fund Flows 
 
This table reports the results of an analysis of monthly flows regressed on indicator variables 
for the covid-19 crisis and the Federal Reserve response, without (1) and with interactions (2) 
among those indicators and different ETF types (Equity, Bond, Foreign Equity, Foreign Bond, 
High Yield, and Investment Grade). Both regressions include controls for the key fund 
characteristics (fund family count, expense ratio, and turn ratio), returns and lagged returns, and 
nav. The time period is January 2019 – September 2020. All specifications include controls for 
a month. Clustered Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. All variables descriptions are 
in Appendix A. 
 
 Flows 
 Without interaction With interaction 
 (1) (2) 
Monthly Returns -0.106 (0.224) -0.108 (0.224) 
1-Period Lagged Returns -0.196 (0.219) -0.197 (0.219) 
2-Period Lagged Returns -0.293 (0.219) -0.292 (0.219) 
Monthly NAV -0.010 (0.020) -0.011 (0.020) 
Family Count -0.007 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) 
Management Fee 0.046 (0.064) 0.049 (0.064) 
Expense Ratio -0.020 (0.016) -0.020 (0.016) 
Turnover Ratio 0.056 (0.046) 0.056 (0.046) 
Crisis (Feb-Mar, 2020) -0.010 (0.007) 0.009 (0.021) 
Response (Apr-May, 2020) 0.026* (0.014) 0.178** (0.072) 
Equity -0.005 (0.007) -0.002 (0.008) 
Bond 0.003 (0.010) 0.007 (0.011) 
Foreign Equity -0.009** (0.004) -0.005 (0.004) 
Foreign Bond 0.002 (0.009) 0.005 (0.010) 
Investment Grade -0.009 (0.014) -0.012 (0.015) 
High Yield 0.008 (0.011) 0.010 (0.012) 
Equity*Crisis  -0.007 (0.021) 
Equity*Response  -0.137* (0.074) 
Bond*Crisis  -0.022 (0.031) 
Bond*Response  -0.144 (0.094) 
Foreign Equity*Crisis  -0.022* (0.012) 
Foreign Equity*Response  -0.068** (0.031) 
Foreign Bond*Crisis  -0.027 (0.028) 
Foreign Bond*Response  -0.024 (0.075) 
Investment Grade*Crisis  0.023 (0.044) 
Investment Grade*Response  0.003 (0.108) 
High Yield*Crisis  -0.010 (0.035) 
High Yield*Response  -0.029 (0.099) 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 27,968 27,968 
R2 0.001 0.002 




Table 4. Impact of the Evolution of Crisis on Fund Flows 
 
This table reports the results of an analysis of monthly flows regressed on indicator variables 
for different stages of the covid-19 crisis, without (1) and with interactions (2) among those 
indicators and different ETF types (Equity, Bond, Foreign Equity, Foreign Bond, High Yield, 
and Investment Grade). Both regressions include controls for the key fund characteristics (fund 
family count, expense ratio, and turn ratio), returns and lagged returns, and nav. The time period 
is January 2019 – September 2020. All specifications include controls for a month. Clustered 
Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. All variables descriptions are in Appendix A. 
  
 Flows 
 Without interaction With interaction 
 (1) (2) 
Monthly Returns -0.035 (0.226) -0.035 (0.226) 
1-Period Lagged Returns -0.188 (0.219) -0.185 (0.219) 
2-Period Lagged Returns -0.311 (0.223) -0.308 (0.223) 
Monthly NAV -0.011 (0.020) -0.011 (0.020) 
Family Count -0.007 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) 
Management Fee 0.046 (0.064) 0.047 (0.064) 
Expense Ratio -0.020 (0.016) -0.020 (0.016) 
Turnover Ratio 0.056 (0.046) 0.057 (0.046) 
Buildup (Feb, 2020) -0.015 (0.010) 0.049* (0.028) 
Peak (Mar, 2020) -0.005 (0.010) -0.035 (0.028) 
Equity -0.004 (0.007) -0.003 (0.008) 
Bond 0.003 (0.010) 0.006 (0.011) 
Foreign Equity -0.009** (0.004) -0.007 (0.004) 
Foreign Bond 0.002 (0.009) 0.005 (0.010) 
Investment Grade -0.009 (0.014) -0.012 (0.015) 
High Yield 0.008 (0.011) 0.009 (0.012) 
Equity*Buildup  -0.077*** (0.029) 
Equity*Peak  0.065** (0.029) 
Bond* Buildup  -0.060 (0.042) 
Bond*Peak  0.019 (0.043) 
Foreign Equity*Buildup  0.023 (0.017) 
Foreign Equity*Peak  -0.064*** (0.017) 
Foreign Bond*Buildup  -0.012 (0.039) 
Foreign Bond*Peak  -0.042 (0.039) 
Investment Grade* Buildup  0.009 (0.060) 
Investment Grade*Peak  0.037 (0.061) 
High Yield* Buildup  -0.024 (0.048) 
High Yield*Peak  0.006 (0.049) 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 27,968 27,968 
R2 0.001 0.003 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 5. Impact of Crisis and Fed Response on Fund Returns 
 
This table reports the results of an analysis of daily returns regressed on indicator variables for 
the covid-19 crisis and indicators for two Federal Reserve response, without (1) and with 
interactions (2) among those indicators and different ETF types (Equity, Bond, Foreign Equity, 
Foreign Bond, High Yield, and Investment Grade). Both regressions include controls for the 
key fund characteristics (fund family count, expense ratio, and turn ratio), returns and lagged 
returns, and nav. The time period is January 2019 – September 2020. All specifications include 
controls for a month. Clustered Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. All variables 





 Without interaction With interaction 
 (1) (2) 
1-Period Lagged Returns -0.181*** (0.001) -0.184*** (0.001) 
2-Period Lagged Returns 0.113*** (0.001) 0.111*** (0.001) 
Daily NAV 0.009*** (0.0004) 0.010*** (0.0004) 
Family Count -0.0004*** (0.0001) -0.0004*** (0.0001) 
Management Fee 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Expense Ratio 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0002) 
Turnover Ratio 0.0002 (0.001) 0.0002 (0.001) 
Crisis (Feb-Mar 23, 2020) -0.011*** (0.0001) -0.010*** (0.0003) 
First Response (Mar 23-Apr 9, 2020) 0.013*** (0.0001) 0.011*** (0.0005) 
Second Response (Apr 9-May, 2020) 0.004*** (0.0001) 0.004*** (0.0003) 
Equity -0.00002 (0.0001) -0.00001 (0.0001) 
Bond -0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0004** (0.0002) 
Foreign Equity 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0004*** (0.0001) 
Foreign Bond 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 
Investment Grade -0.0001 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) 
High Yield 0.00003 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) 
Equity*Crisis  -0.002*** (0.0003) 
Equity*First Response  0.004*** (0.001) 
Equity*Second Response  0.0001 (0.0003) 
Bond*Crisis  0.007*** (0.0005) 
Bond*First Response  -0.006*** (0.001) 
Bond*Second Response  -0.002*** (0.0005) 
Foreign Equity*Crisis  -0.0005** (0.0002) 
Foreign Equity*First Response  -0.003*** (0.0003) 
Foreign Equity*Second Response  -0.0005** (0.0002) 
Foreign Bond*Crisis  -0.002*** (0.0005) 
Foreign Bond*First Response  0.001** (0.001) 
Foreign Bond*Second Response  0.001 (0.0005) 
Investment Grade*Crisis  0.002*** (0.001) 
Investment Grade*First Response  -0.003** (0.001) 
Investment Grade*Second Response  -0.0003 (0.001) 
High Yield*Crisis  -0.003*** (0.001) 
High Yield*First Response  0.003*** (0.001) 
High Yield*Second Response  0.0003 (0.001) 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 835,541 835,541 
R2 0.079 0.081 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 6. Impact of the Evolution of Crisis on Fund Returns 
 
This table reports the results of an analysis of daily returns regressed on indicator variables for 
different stages of the covid-19 crisis, without (1) and with interactions (2) among those 
indicators and different ETF types (Equity, Bond, Foreign Equity, Foreign Bond, High Yield, 
and Investment Grade). Both regressions include controls for the key fund characteristics (fund 
family count, expense ratio, and turn ratio), returns and lagged returns, and nav. The time period 
is January 2019 – September 2020. All specifications include controls for a month. Clustered 











 Without interaction With interaction 
 (1) (2) 
1-Period Lagged Returns -0.164*** (0.001) -0.167*** (0.001) 
2-Period Lagged Returns 0.125*** (0.001) 0.123*** (0.001) 
Daily NAV 0.009*** (0.0004) 0.009*** (0.0004) 
Family Count -0.0004*** (0.0001) -0.0004*** (0.0001) 
Management Fee 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Expense Ratio 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0002) 
Turnover Ratio 0.0002 (0.001) 0.0002 (0.001) 
Buildup (Feb, 2020) -0.004*** (0.0001) -0.004*** (0.0004) 
Outbreak (Mar 1-13, 2020) -0.011*** (0.0002) -0.011*** (0.001) 
Peak (Mar 13-Apr, 2020) 0.002*** (0.0001) 0.001*** (0.0003) 
Equity -0.00000 (0.0001) 0.00002 (0.0001) 
Bond -0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0004*** (0.0001) 
Foreign Equity 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 
Foreign Bond 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 
Investment Grade -0.0001 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) 
High Yield 0.00003 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0002) 
Equity*Buildup  -0.001*** (0.0004) 
Equity*Outbreak  -0.001 (0.001) 
Equity*Peak  0.001* (0.0003) 
Bond* Buildup  0.004*** (0.001) 
Bond*Outbreak  0.010*** (0.001) 
Bond*Peak  -0.002*** (0.001) 
Foreign Equity*Buildup  -0.00001 (0.0003) 
Foreign Equity*Outbreak  -0.004*** (0.0004) 
Foreign Equity*Peak  -0.0003 (0.0002) 
Foreign Bond*Buildup  -0.001* (0.001) 
Foreign Bond*Outbreak  -0.002*** (0.001) 
Foreign Bond*Peak  0.0001 (0.0005) 
Investment Grade* Buildup  0.001 (0.001) 
Investment Grade*Outbreak  0.003** (0.001) 
Investment Grade*Peak  -0.0001 (0.001) 
High Yield* Buildup  -0.001 (0.001) 
High Yield*Outbreak  -0.004*** (0.001) 
High Yield*Peak  -0.001 (0.001) 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 835,541 835,541 
R2 0.061 0.062 






Figure 1. CBOE Volatility Index Time Series 
 
This figure plots a time-series of daily VIX closing prices. The time period is September 2019 
to September 2020.  It is a proprietary elaboration based VIX closing data from the Yahoo 




Figure 2. Aggregated Net Cash Flows for ETFs by Asset Class 
 
This figure plots a monthly evolution of aggregated net cash flows for ETFs by three asset 
classes: Equity, Municipal Bonds, and Treasury. The time period is September 2019 to 
September 2020.  It is a proprietary elaboration based on the monthly time-series and fund 
characteristics data from the CRSP Fund Mutual database.  
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Figure 3. Average Flows for ETFs by Asset Class 
 
This figure plots a monthly evolution of average flows for ETFs of three asset classes: Equity, 
Municipal Bonds, and Treasury. The time period is September 2019 to September 2020.  It is a 
proprietary elaboration based on the estimation of flows from the monthly time-series and fund 
characteristics data from the CRSP Fund Mutual database. Flow averages do not include funds 
that were created after Q3 2018. 
 
 
Figure 4. Weighted Cumulative Returns for ETFs by Asset Class 
 
This figure plots the daily time-series of weighted cumulative returns for ETFs of three asset 
classes: Equity, Municipal Bonds, and Treasury. The time period is September 2019 to 
September 2020.  It is a proprietary elaboration based on the daily time-series and fund 
characteristics data from the CRSP Fund Mutual database. The cumulative returns were 
calculated since September 2019. For simplicity, the weights were calculated using the Total 





Figure 5. Average Net Asset Value for ETFs by Asset Class 
 
This table represents daily time-series of average net asset value for ETFs of three different 
asset classes: Equity, Municipal Bonds, and Treasuries. The time period is September 2019 to 
September 2020. It is a proprietary elaboration based on the daily time-series and fund 
characteristics data from the CRSP Fund Mutual database.  
 
 
Figure 6. Average Monthly Total Net Asset Value for ETFs by Asset Class 
 
This table represents monthly time-series of average total net asset value for ETFs of three 
different asset classes: Equity, Municipal Bonds, Treasuries. The time period is September 2019 
to September 2020. It is a proprietary elaboration based on the monthly time-series and fund 








Figure 7. AUM Top Movers for Treasury ETF by Lipper Asset Class in Q1 2020 
 
This table represents change during Q1 2020 of aggregated treasury ETFs' total net assets by 
Lipper Asset Class classification of funds for the top five and bottom five movers, the most 
significant change. It is a proprietary elaboration based on quarterly fund characteristics data 
from the CRSP Fund Mutual database.  
 
 
Figure 8. AUM Top Movers for Municipal Bonds ETF by Lipper Asset Class in Q1 2020 
 
This table represents change during Q1 2020 of aggregated municipal bonds ETFs' total net 
assets by Lipper Asset Class classification of funds for the top five and bottom five movers, the 
most significant change. It is a proprietary elaboration based on quarterly fund characteristics 






Figure 9. AUM Top Movers for Equity ETF by Lipper Asset Class in Q1 2020 
 
This table represents change during Q1 2020 of aggregated equity ETFs' total net assets by 
Lipper Asset Class classification of funds for the top five and bottom five movers, the most 
significant change. It is a proprietary elaboration based on quarterly fund characteristics data 
from the CRSP Fund Mutual database.   
 
 
